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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
History of Merger Activity 
The United States is undergoing a merger wave of 
giant proportions. The current merger wave began in 1948 
and has continued unabated for over twenty years. Data on 
mergers and acquisitions (see Table 1) denotes that American 
business is characterized by the appetite corporate manage­
ments have for absorbing other companies. The data in 
Table 1 are indicated by the increase in merger activity 
during the last two decades. From 1950 to 1959 there were 
a total of 4,789 mergers and from i960 to I969 this figure 
increased to 12,579 total mergers.
In the most recent year, for which complete data 
are available (I969), there were a total of 2,246 mergers 
in the manufacturing and mining sectors, which involved an 
exchange of $10.6 billion in assets.^ For the period 1948- 
1969, acquired assets in manufacturing and mining totaled 
$63.7 billion.^ In terms of either the number of firms dis­
appearing or the size of the assets changing ownership, the
U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Current Trends in 
Merger Activity. 1969. Table 2 and Table 11 (Washington, 
D.C.i Government Printing Office), p. 16 (hereafter abbrevi 
ated FTC, Report).
TABLE 1
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS--MANUPACTURING AND 
MINING CONCERNS ACQUIRED# 1950-1970
Assets ($ MillionsyNumber
Horizontal Horizontal
& Vertical Conglomerate TotedL̂ & Vertical Conglomerate
Years Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers Assets Mergers Mergers
I960 8# 62 19 43 $ 1,689 $ 566 $ 1.1221961 954 55 23 32 2,056 805 1.2511962 853 73 25 48 2,290 1.051 1.2401963 861 71 22 49 2,984 1.187 1.7961964 854 90 30 60 2,736 ' 974 1.762
1965 1,008 90 27 63 3.835 769 3.0681966 995 98 22 76 4,153 629 3.5257.4931967 1,496 167 28 139 9,090 1.5961968 2,407 206 33 173 13.311 1.504 11.807
1969 2,307 152 29 123 11,036 2.990 8.0451970 1,344** 88** 9̂ ^ 79*̂ 5.447** 1.073** 4.375**
to
SOURCE# U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States# 1971. (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 
1971), p. 474.
NOTE# Total limited to actions.reported by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 
and Standard and Poor's Corporation. Many smaller acquisitions are not reported in 
these sources. Includes partial acquisitions when they comprise whole divisions of 
other companies.
♦Includes all concqms with assets of $10 million and over.
♦♦Preliminary.
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post-World War II merger movement is the largest one in 
United States history*
The first merger wave in the United States occurred 
between 1698 and 1902.̂  During this short period of time, 
mergers
• • • transformed many industries, formerly char­acterised by many small and medium-sised firms, 
into those in which one or a very few large enter­
prises occupied leading positions. It laid the 
foundation for the industrial structure that has 
characterised most^pf American industry into the 
twentieth century.
In terms of sise, however, this was the smallest of the 
merger waves with a total of 2,653 reported mergers in manu­
facturing and mining, accounting for an exchange of assets 
of $6.3 billlon.3
The second merger wave took place between 1926 and 
1938.* In terms of magnitude, this was the second largest 
of the three merger waves with 5,846 reported mergers during 
the period.^ In terms of capitalisations, the small amount
of available evidence indicates that this merger wave was
8larger than the tum-of-the-century wave. In terms of
^Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American 
Industry. 1895-1956. (Princetoni Princeton UniversityPress, 
1959). p. 5.
*ibid.
%«unuel R. Reid, Mergers. Managers mid the Economy. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19o8), p. 38.
Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 5*
R̂eid, Mergers. Managers. p. 38.
®Ibid.
k
importance# however» this merger movement did not have the 
effect on industrial concentration as did the first merger 
wave. The late 1920's movement has generally been thought 
of as an attempt "• • .to restore the industrial concentra­
tion which heul become diluted over the years,
The third merger movement had its beginning in the 
1950s. The period from the early 1950s to the 1960s» how­
ever» was a rather dormant period as far as acquisitions 
were concerned. Then» in the mid-1960s» expansion by merger 
negotiation became a popular management policy. The present 
merger wave differs from its predecessors not so much in 
magnitude (when inflation and business population are taken 
into account) but rather in the type of merger activity that 
is being pursued. As indicated in Table 1» for the last two 
decades mergers have been growing at an increasing rate 
until only the last several years when merger activity has 
started to decrease.
The first two merger waves were attempts to mono­
polize markets by either acquiring a significant number of 
one's competitors and/or the precluding of new entry by 
acquiring the producers of inputs of very inelastic supply. 
The present merger wave is dominated by mergers of the con­
glomerate variety. These firms neither compete in the same 
output markets nor are they related in either's input market.
^Nelson» Merger Movements, p. 5*
For example» of all the large mergers^^ which took place in 
manufacturing and mining in the 1948-1969 period» 66.7 per 
cent of them (representing 65.1 per cent of the acquired 
assets) were of the conglomerate type.^^ Although horizon­
tal and vertical mergers are no longer dominant types of 
acquisitions» the number of such mergers and the amount of 
assets involved is still very large when compared to either 
of the first two merger waves.
In the legal sense» a merger involves the combina­
tion of two or more firms» with one of the former independent 
firms remaining as the surviving entity. The Federal Trade 
Commission's definition of a merger includes
. . . only those purchases or transfers of ownership 
of a company (or division of a company) that repre­
sent a merger of two companies previously under 
separate control • . • the purchase of stock not leading to a majority ownership interest is excluded.
More specifically» the occurrence of a merger can be defined 
as a combination of two or more previously independent busi­
ness enterprises into a single enterprise under the control 
of a single management. This can occur where (1) a company 
acquires all the assets of another company » (2) a company 
acquires more than $0 per cent of the equity securities of
10A leirge merger is defined by the Federal Trade 
Commission as one in which the acquisition represents assets 
of $10 million or more.
^̂ U.S.» Federal Trade Commission» Large Mergers in 
Manufacturing and Mining. 1948-1969, Table 2 (Washington» DC.: Government Printing Office» 1969)» p. 2,
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another company, or (3) two companies combine to form a 
brand new enterprise. For all intents and purposes, these 
forms of combinations can be viewed as being sufficiently 
similar to be lumped into the single classification of 
*a merger,
Types of Mergers 
The volume of merger activity has been subject to 
large fluctuations over timet also, the types of mergers 
which have been most popular at any given moment have shown 
a corresponding diversity. The object of this section is to 
describe the various types of mergers.
It is very common to divide merger activity into 
three typest horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. A
conglomerate merger is defined as ". . .an acquisition that
is neither horizontal nor vertical.** The horizontal mer­
ger dominated the first two merger waves while vertical 
mergers accounted for virtually the entire remainder of 
total merger activity in the first two merger waves. In the
early years of the present merger wave there has been a
steady shift away from the horizontal and vertical merger 
to the conglomerate merger.
^The terms merger, acquisition, and consolidation 
shall be used interchangeably. These terms refer to the 
absorption of a previously independent business entity (or 
a substantial portion thereof) by another business enterprise.
14U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report 
on Corporate Mergers yd Acouisitions (Washington, D.C.; 
Government Printing Office, 1955)# P- 50.
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From 1948 to 19511 horizontal and verticaLl mergers 
amounted to 62 per cent of all merger activity, and conglom­
erate mergers amounted to 38 per cent of all merger activity. 
Merger percentages shifted until in 1968, conglomerate mer­
gers amounted to 91 per cent and horizontal and vertical 
mergers amounted to 9 per cent of all merger activity 
The shift to conglomerate mergers has been attributed to 
several factorsi (1) the increase in antitrust and monopoly
legislation activity by Congress,and (2) changes in cor-
18porate tax laws over the last several decades.
Economists have identified a number of reemons why 
firms choose to grow by mergers. The businessmen's typical 
motivations for merging include the desire for such advan­
tages as easy market entry, acquisition of new technological 
skills or patent rights, procurement of needed managerial 
skills, acquiring a listing on a national exchange, the 
protection of input and output markets, achieving greater 
capital and earnings strength, cyclical and secular stabil­
ity, and tax advantages.
^ . S . , Congress, Senate, Report of President Nixon's 
Task Force on Productivity and Competition. S. Doc. 98. 91st 
Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 6481.
^^John C. Narv.r, Conglomérat. Merger. Mid Market 
Competition. (Berkley• University of California Press. 196?) 
p. 37.
18John K. Butters, John Lintner and William L. Carey, 
Effects of Taxation: Corporate Mergers. (Cambridge, Mass.t 
The Riverside Press, 1951).
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In analysing merger causes or motives» it is import­
ant to recognise that there are two levels of causationt
first» motives for growth i and second » factors which make a
10merger a preferred method of growth.  ̂ Firms may wish to
grow for a variety of reasonsi to achieve economies of large-
scale production or distribution» to attain market power» or
simply to grow larger because doing so increases profits and
20the overall prestige of the firm and its management.
When a firm has any of the above incentives for 
growth» it next must decide upon the most effective (from 
its standpoint) way of growings internal expansion or merger. 
The merger is often more advantageous for a variety of 
reasons. It permits the purchase of personnel» products 
and technology. It may be easier to finance. Perhaps most 
importantly» it permits expanding one's position in an 
existing industry or entry into a new one without distrubing
the competitive situation by adding new capacity and a new
21competitor to the industry. Because these factors favor­
ing mergers are always present» companies which have an 
incentive to grow will often find it to their own advantage 
to grow by merging.
10̂U.S.» Federal Trade Commission» Concentration 
Trends and Merger Activity in U.S. Manufacturing Industries 
Since World War II (Washington. D.C.i Government Minting 
Office» 1967), p. 7.
°̂Ibid., p. 8.
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Following is a definition and example of each type 
of merger and an economic justification or motivation for 
its occurrence.
Horizontal Mergers
A merger is horizontal idien the companies involved 
produce one or more of the same# or closely related# products 
in the same geographic market. Horizontal growth would in­
clude mergers with businesses that were involved in# or
22similar to# the acquiring company's basic product. An 
example of a horizontal merger would be a television tube 
manufacturer acquiring another company which also produces 
television tubes. Another example is a bank acquiring the 
bank across the street.
There are several reasons for expanding a business 
through a horizontal merger. First# the company being 
acquired could possess strong management talent that the 
acquiring company felt would help strengthen the parent 
company. Secondly# the acquiring company could strengthen 
its market position# through the application of good manage-
24ment technique# by acquiring a company with weak management.
22Myles L. Mace and George G. Montgomery# Management 
Problems of Corporate Acquisitions. (Boston; Graduate School 
of Business Administration# Harvard University# 1962)# p. 9.
H. Hennessy# Jr., Acquiring and Merging Busi­
nesses. (Englewood Cliffs# New Jersey; Prentice-Hall# Inc.#
1966), p. 7.
2*lbid.
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A third reason is that a merger sometimes provides the 
cheapest way to acquire the assets required for expansion. 
Also horizontal mergers are expected to yield economies of 
scale in production, management services and promotional
activity. In addition, it should yield increased market
26control and concentration. *
Vertical Mergers
A merger is vertical when the two companies had a
buyer-seller relationship prior to the merger. Vertical
growth is defined as the acquisition of a business which is
a supplier to the acquiring company or a business for which
27the acquiri% company is a supplier. ' A merger between 
firms which are in direct line from raw materials to sales 
is a vertical merger. An example of a vertical merger is 
the acquisition of a tire manufacturing company .by an auto­
mobile manufacturing firm or the acquisition of a retail 
clothing chain by a clothing manufacturer.
The main purpose of merging vertically, besides 
increased company profits, is to provide the acquiring com­
pany with an assured supply of raw materials or to insure a 
ready outlet for the product being manufactured. Management 
may or may not be an important factor in merging vertically.
Ẑ ibid.
;
27
26Federal Trade Commission, Large Mergers, p. 4.
Mace and Montgomery, Management Problems, p. 23.
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depending upon the amount of difference between the two
companies. Also, vertical mergers are expected to yield
28economies in purchasing and/or distribution.
Frequently, it becomes difficult to differentiate 
between horizontal and vertical mergers because of the 
circumstances involved. For example, a vertical merger 
can be in the same related field of electronic equipment 
as the acquiring company, making it difficult to classify 
the merger as either vertical or horizontal.
Conglomerate Mergers 
A conglomerate merger involves the consolidation of 
two essentially unrelated firms or the accumulation of 
diverse companies under one corporate structure. In I968,
90 per cent of the mergers involving $11 billion of assets 
were associated with conglomerate mergers. Even though 
merger activity has leveled off the last several years, the 
conglomerate merger continues to play an important role in 
merger activity, accounting for a majority of all mergers 
and acquisitions (Table 1).
A conglomerate merger brings together dissimilar 
and unrelated firms under the same corporate management.
The product made by the company being acquired would not be 
closely related to the primary product of the parent company.
®̂FTC, Report, p. 4-5.
^̂ ••Conglomerates Under Attack," Financial World. 
March 12, I969, P- 3.
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An example would be an aerospace company acquiring an ice 
cream manufacturer* The "pure" conglomerate merger affords 
little or no opportunity to achieve economies of scale since 
it is more analogous to a holding company than to the usual 
concept of "the firm." However, conglomerate mergers do 
offer the opportunity to lessen risk by a process similar 
to portfolio diversification.When two companies are in 
related manufacturing fields it sometimes becomes difficult 
to distinguish between the vertical merger and the conglomer­
ate merger. In many cases the end product is the only factor 
that separates the two mergers.
The Contribution of the Paper 
The current merger wave began ten years ago. The 
past thirteen years have seen the third giant merger wave 
in U. S. financial history. The two-year period of I968- 
1969 alone brought 10,59^ merger announcements, and they 
obviously involved many times that number of people.As 
merger activity continues to increase, the impact on the 
corporate executive becomes more significant.
According to several current periodicals, the in­
crease in merger activity over the past decade has resulted
30PTC, Report, p. 4-5.
^^Richard J. Bolund, "Merger Planning— How Much 
Weight Do Personnel Factors Carry?" Personnel. March, 1970, p. 8.
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in the displacement of many top business executives. These 
displacements were the result of massive transfers or firings 
by the acquiring companies# resignations due to frictions# 
fears# anxieties# and forced retirements.^^
The reasons for executive displacement have been 
identified. Inferences about the relative importance of 
management policy and the type of merger as they influence 
executive displacement have been drawn. Specifically# the 
paper is a detailed study of the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions upon the top management personnel of companies 
being acquired. A comprehensive examination of the acquisi­
tions of Litton Industries# Inc. provides the basis for the 
study.
Mergers and acquisitions have played a leading role 
in Litton Industries# Inc. growth and in establishing Litton 
in the wide array of fields in which it currently does busi­
ness. Litton Industries# Inc. has acquired 97 companies 
during the period I958-I969. Of these companies# 20 were 
large# each having assets of $10 million or more at the time 
of acquisition.Questions concerning the problems that top 
management encounters during merger activity and the policies
^^Robert C. Albrook# "The Frustrations of the Acquired 
Executive#" Fortune. November# 19&9, p. 152.
33"Merge, Merge— But What About the People?" Newsweek. 
September 23» 1968# p. 85.
 ̂Federal Trade Commission# Economic Report on Cor­
porate Mergers. I969# p. 56I.
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of Litton as they relate to the personnel changes involved 
in the mergers have been examined. The questions to which 
answers are attempted are#
A. The personnel problems associated with 
merger negotiation.
B. The extent of executive displacement 
involved in the mergers studied.
C. Type of merger with respect to executive 
displacement.
Assumptions and Limitations
The object of this section is to explain how Litton 
was selected as a basis for the study and to set forth some 
ground rules for conducting the examination of Litton Indus­
tries, Inc.
Litton Industries, in its relatively short life of 
just over fifteen years as one of the larger conglomerates, 
has acquired over a half billion dollars in assets of various 
companies.Over 90 per cent of this amount has been acquir­
ed since 1961.̂ * It is clear from the foregoing figures that 
mergers and acquisitions have played a leading role in Litton*s 
conglomerate. Acquired assets during the I96I-I968 interval 
represented almost one-half of the increase in Litton*s 
assets from $119 million in i960 to $1.4 billion on January 31, 
1969. Because of Litton*s tremendous growth during the 
1960s, it was selected as being representative of merging
Ŝ ibld., p. 557. 3*Ibld. 3?Ibid., p. 562.
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companies during the merger active years of I96I-I969, (In 
i960 Litton ranked below the 500 largest industrials and by 
the end of 1968» Litton had assets of over $1 billion and had 
become the 5^th largest manufacturing company in the United 
States, It may be observed in Table 2 that Litton*s acqui­
sition pattern was not dominated by large firms. Rather» 17 
firms with over $10 million in assets were acquired. The 
mergers and acquisitions of Litton are broad enough to cover 
small, medium» and large firms providing sufficient data upon 
which valid conclusions can be made.
The study of Litton*s mergers consists of an exami­
nation of the disposition of the top executives of the 
acquired companies after the merger. The term "top executive" 
is defined as the chairman of the board of directors and 
corporate officers. The members of the board of directors are 
not considered unless they are also officers of the company. 
This approach is taken on the assumption that on many occa­
sions board members who are not officers of the company tend 
to serve only in advisory capacities» therefore their main 
employment would not be directly affected by a merger.
The executives of corporations being acquired are 
traced for two years after the merger. It is the assumption 
of the study that following a merger the majority of person­
nel changes occurring in two years are the direct result of
3*Ibid., p. 557.
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the merger and not due to normal attrition activities. Any 
period of time in excess of two years would start to reveal 
some personnel changes due to promotions, normal retirements, 
and not to the effects of the merger. To use a period less 
than two years introduces a risk of not allowing enough time 
for the merger to result in personnel changes.
The use of a short time period is especially critical 
when considering the fact that Poor's Register of Directors 
and Executives and Moody's Industrial Manuad. which are the 
primary source of data for the study, could possible encount­
er a delay in showing the changes in personnel structure of 
a company after the merger since they are published on a 
yearly basis. Using two years as a basic time should mini­
mize this problem.
The companies examined in Chapters IV and V include 
those acquisitions that occurred after Litton became known as 
a conglomerate company. The companies include those acquisi­
tions made after the merger with Monroe Calculating Machine 
Company in 195&, which was Litton's first major diversifica­
tion. The 26 companies which are studied include all mergers 
which were large enough to be considered a significant acqui­
sition (see Table 3). Moody's Industrial Manual and Poor's 
Corporate Records define a significant acquisition as being 
vdiolly owned by the parent company. These companies are 
listed in Table 3 on the following page and are discussed 
in Chapter VI and V. The significant mergers of Litton are
18
TABLE 3
SELECTED COMPANIES ACQUIRED 
BY LITTON, 1958-1969
Year
Acquired Assets 
($ Millions)
$50 Million or More
Royal McBee Corp. 1965 $70
$10-$fm Million
Monroe Calculating Machine Co. 1958 25Eureka Specialty Printing Co. 1961 11Cole Steel Equipment Co. 1961 13Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. 1962 16
Fitchburg Paper Co. 1964 14Hewitt-Robins, Inc. 1965 49Stouffer Foods Corp. 1967 35
$5-$9 Million
McKieman-Terry Corp. 1962 9Aero Service Corp. 1962 6Clifton Precision Pro­
ducts Co., Inc. 1963 7Alder Electronics, Inc. 1963 9Streater Industries, Inc. 1964 6
McCray Refrigerator Co. 1966 8
Kester Solder Co. 1967 6
Less Than $5 Million
Maryland Electronic Co. 1958 -Westrex Co. 1958 -Times Facsimile Corp. 1959 -Poly Scientific Corp. 1962 -Winchester Electric Co. 1963 —Alvey-Ferguson Corp. 1966 -
Maverick-Clark Co. 1966 -
Electra Motors Co. 1966 -
Sturgis Business Equipment Co. 1966 -
Eureka X-Ray Co. 1967 -Chainveyor Corp. 1967
SOURCE: U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers (Washington, D.C.i Government 
Printing Office, I969), p. 56I.
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studied to insure that data presented are comparable. This 
methodology cannot yield definitive statements about the 
success or failure of Litton as a conglomerate. However, it 
can identify factors, trends, and patterns involved in the 
displacement of top executives when mergers occur.
In view of the fact that horizontal and vertical 
mergers are still important, a study which dealt solely with 
conglomerate mergers «diile excluding all other types of mer­
gers would suffer from a degree of incompleteness. A study 
which focused attention on the total of merger activity, and 
ignored the important distinctions between merger types, 
could also be criticized for being insufficient. In prac­
tice it is difficult to classify some mergers as being any 
one particular type. In order to simplify the study of 
Litton's mergers, types of mergers are combined where they 
show certain common characteristics. Vertical mergers in­
clude concentric marketing companies (same customer type as 
buying company but different technology) and horizontal 
mergers to include concentric technology (same technology 
as buying company but different customer type) . Diverse 
acquisitions are based upon the original companies make-up 
(customers and technology different from that of the buying 
company).^®
^^John Hitching, Hfhy Do Mergers Miscarry?** Harvard 
Business Review. November-Deeember, 196?, p. 84.
*Olbid.
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Summary
The background of merger activity in the United 
States was discussed in Chapter I and the various merger 
types that play an integral role in the displacement of 
executives during various mergers and acquisitions was set 
forth.
The purpose of Chapter II is to provide a background 
against which the policies and actions of Litton can be 
studied regarding executive displacement, not to provide a 
thorough examination of all the problems of management with 
respect to mergers. Chapter II consists of a general discus­
sion of the various problems such as fear, anxieties, and 
frictions that occur among top management when businesses 
are acquired. An attempt is made to show how these problems 
can affect businesses involved in merging and how they differ 
according to merger type. Chapter III presents a background 
of Litton Industries in order to illustrate what was the 
company's policy toward growth during the 1960s. In addi­
tion, the chapter considers Litton*s management policies 
during this period with respect to everyday operations and 
to stated policies concerning merger criteria.
Chapters IV and V consist of an examination of the 
more important acquisitions of Litton with respect to the 
effects of these acquisitions upon top management personnel. 
The examination consists of a classification of each merger 
type and a determination of the amount of personnel change
21
involved for each merger. The horizontal and vertical mer­
gers are discussed in Chapter IV and the conglomerate 
mergers are discussed in Chapter V.
Chapter VI consists of a sunmiary of the information 
presented in the first four chapters and conclusions are 
drawn concerning the study. No attempt is made to relate 
any specific problem to any particular merger. In deter­
mining whether or not Litton overcame the problems listed 
in Chapter II, consideration is given to Litton's policies 
and conclusions drawn as to their possible affects upon 
these problems. Also, consideration is given to the indirect 
evidence offered by the changes which occurred in the person­
nel of the companies acquired by Litton in the 1960s.
CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT 
WHEN MERGERS OCCUR
The accepted corporate philosophy during the current 
merger wave held that the easiest way to increase profit was 
to increase sales volume, and the best way to increase sales 
volume was to acquire and expand established, companies.^ 
Unfortunately, many acquisitions were made on the basis of 
their balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements, and
insufficient attention was paid to the study and evaluation
2of the strength and potential of the management group. The
impact on the corporate executive during this time period
.
(̂1960-1969) was significant. At the same time expanding 
corporations were searching for qualified management person­
nel, executive displacement was rising as a result of cor­
porate mergers.
The period from 1950 to i960 was a slow era as far 
as mergers are concerned. But the third of the giant merger 
waves in United States financisd history occurred during the 
past thirteen years. Time and experience have matured the
^Richard J. Wytmar, "Merger and the Executive, 
Business Horizons. December I969, p. 50.
Îbid.
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merger movement of today, but despite existing merger poli­
cies, executive displacement still occurs. With the increase 
in merger activity over the last decade, there has been an 
increase in personnel problems associated with mergers. The 
reasons for executive displacement are varied in nature and 
are the result of personnel frictions, feeurs, types of mer­
gers, pre-merger evaluation and post-merger integration.
Significance of Fear as a 
Factor in Mergers
Executives have become increasingly fearful of dis­
placement due to mergers.3 Many acquisitions are followed 
quickly by early retirements, resignations, and separation
iLof key personnel. It is not uncommon for an executive to 
believe that if a merger occurs, there will be wholesale 
displacement of personnel. The fear of displacement is not 
without basis, because displacement is the case in many 
mergers. For example, when Norge Corporation was acquired 
by Fedders Corporation, 15 top executives and 55 members of 
the Norge headquarters staff of 250 were laid off. When 
American Motors, Inc. sold Kelvinator Corporation to White 
Consolidated Industries, Inc., 400 out of 600 employees were 
fired, including many of the top executives.^ When White
^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 84.
^Fredrick W. Searby, "Control Postmerger Change, 
Harvard Business Review. September-October, I969, p. 8.
^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85.
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Consolidated acquired Blaw-Knox Co., 60 of the 65 supervi­
sory personnel who worked in Blaw-Knox's main office were 
replaced within a year; 30 were transferred to other offices 
and 30 quit, retired, or were fired.* These examples are 
extreme, and not totally representative of all mergers, but 
they are the mergers which receive the most publicity and 
do more than their share of instilling fear into any execu­
tive who may expect his company to be involved in a merger.
Who are the executives most likely to be affected 
by a merger? A survey by the Harvard Business Review showed 
the chief executive officer of the acquired company was at 
the top of the list.? The survey also indicated that the 
higher an individual was on the executive ladder, the more 
vulnerable he became (in time of merger). In addition, the 
fear of displacement became increasingly severe as the execu­
tive grew older and received a higher salary. When a deci­
sion must be made between two individuals for the same job, 
the younger man has more potential for growth with the
ocompany and can be retained for less money. The consequences 
for senior executives— both the strong and the weak— can be 
equally serious. Often a merger strips the protective blanket
*Wall Street Journal. "Take-Over Traumas," May 15#
1969. p. 1.
?John L. Handy, "How to Face Being Taken Over," 
Harvard Business Review. Hovember-December, I969, p. 110.
QWall Street Journal. "Surplus Executives," Febru- 
ary 14, 1967. p. 1.
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from men who have been getting by on their seniority and old 
friendships,9 The fear of displacement is then magnified for 
the older executive who knows that once he loses his present 
job, it is difficult for him to find another one at anywhere 
near his previous salary,^®
Frictions Caused bv Mergers 
The executive next most vulnerable due to the merger 
was the high-priced staff officer in administration, legal 
services, personnel, finance, or accounting. These functions 
are usually duplicated, therefore they can be absorbed by the 
acquiring company.A noted author on mergers and acquisi­
tions states,
. . . the problems of integrating two companies that are accustomed to being two separate entities are 
always difficult, even under the best circumstances, 
and may in some cases be so painful that not only is 
the anticipated success of the acquisition lost, but 
also the buyer's own business is seriously damaged.
As a result, many economically attractive mergers have fedlen
through because the transaction threatened the job security
of the personnel of the selling company.
"Take-over" attempts or intramural weurs between staff
departments having the same responsibilities (e.g., data
^Robert C. Albrook, "Those Boxed-In, Left-Out Vice 
Presidents," Fortune. May I969, p. I05.
^^all Street Journal. "Surplus Executives," p. 1.
^̂ Handy, "How to Face Being Taken Over," HBR. p. 110.
^̂ B. R. Wakefield, "Mergers and Acquisitions," Harvard 
Business Review. September-October, 1965, p. 6.
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processing• credit, public relations, or treasury) often 
create displacement problems.An acquired executive may 
have a counterpart at the acquiring company, and quite likely 
there is no need for both individuals eifter the merger. Fre­
quently, in cases inhere two individuals qualify for the same 
job, one executive is promoted to a meaningless position 
until some means of replacing him can be found or until he 
quits out of sheer frustration. For example, differences 
in managerial style or philosophy that are not at first 
apparent can undo an acquired executive. An acquired execu­
tive must face several new facts after a merger occursi 
(1) he has acquired a new boss and that he exists in a new 
organizational pyramid, and (2) he must meet the new owner's 
demands for steady and growing return on investment.If 
an executive is unable to thrive in his new environment, he 
eventually will be eliminated from the company through retire­
ment or resignation.
Even when the acquiring company has no intentions of 
disturbing the personnel structure of the acquired company, 
frictions which can reduce morale and efficiency of employees 
c m  occur. The extent of these frictions can depend upon the 
type of merger involvedi horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.
l^Ibid., p. 8.
^^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85. 
^^Albrook, "Frustrations," Fortune, p. 159.
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Where two companies have hetergeneous products and %diere 
little or no physical operating consolidation is planned, 
separate operating policies can be continued without change. 
The result in this instance may cause little or no manage­
ment friction. Where it is important to bring the people 
of both companies into close# continuing contact# differences
in personnel or management policies may quickly lead to cries
17of discrimination and personnel friction.
Pre-Merger and Post-Merger Problems 
Normally a company has a well-defined goal in mind 
when looking for an acquisition# but frequently mergers 
occur for the purpose of improving the operation of a deteri­
orating company. The merger negotiation usually is centered 
upon immediate financial advantages that each company expects 
to realize— typically# greater personal liquidity for the 
sellers and an improved balance sheet or price-eamings
T Oratio for the buyer. But in many instances# the profound 
differences between two companies in their organization#
/
style and in the personality of their leaders is often over­
looked. For example# take the case where an acquisition is 
made for the sole purpose of taking excessive funds out of 
the acquired company as quickly as possible; then disposing
^^Hennessy# Acquiring and Merging, p. 7.
18Albrook, "Frustrations#" Fortune, p. 153.
28
of what Is left of the company when realized profits are 
exhausted. A merger of this nature would definitely have a 
deleterious effect on the morale and longevity of the acquir­
ed management.
Sullen resistance and poor cooperation almost always 
occur after every merger; improbable rumors spread, key execu­
tives quit, and workers strike over seemingly trivial issues. 
In several instances, executives have left a company because
there was a lack of preparation, time, and research associ-
20ated with the merger negotiations. After a merger, certain 
executives will resist post-merger change and challenge the 
new leadership. Those who cannot be reoriented to new organ­
izational relationships are normally eliminated from the 
company in some manner.
Studies by John hitching, a noted author on mergers, 
indicates that an importeuit influence on the success or 
failure of any type cf merger is the nature of the reporting 
relationships set up between parent and acquired companies
along with the organizational responsibilities and control
21systems established. Experts on merging companies contend 
that much of the turmoil resulting from acquisition is 
caused by companies doing a poor job of evaluating the skills
^^Alan N. Schoonmaker, “Why Mergers Don't Jell,“ 
Personnel. September-October, I969, p. 42.
^^“What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85,
^̂ Kitching, “Mergers Miscarry," HBR. p. 84.
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and desires of the personnel they are acquiring. The result
is pre-merger and post-merger problems» personnel disenchant-
22ment» and people quitting after the take-over.
In an acquired company where the productivity of top 
management » staff» department heads» and other key personnel 
is unenthusiastic» the individuals of the acquired firm are 
seldom to blame. These people have lost their incentive for 
enthusiasm and high speed performance as a result of post­
merger blundersPre- and post-merger preparation indicates 
that the chances of success are dependent upon the parent 
company's ability to adequately motivate the people they have 
acquired. C. M. Leighton and G. R. Tod state that the most 
definite way to achieve corporate objectives after an acqui­
sition is to effectively motivate the management of the new 
24company.
In most successful mergers» the acquiring company 
either brings in new management or it motivates the old man­
agement to introduce profitable change. An employee of an 
acquired company who has been placed under the control of an 
executive of the parent company and who is told to change his 
methods and policies without being previously informed about
^^all Street Journal. "Take-Over Traumas»" p. 1.
^^Robert A. Short. Merger Si How and When to Transact 
Them. (Englewood Cliffs» N.J.; Prentice-Hall» Inc.» 19&7),
pTff?.
24Charles M. Leighton and G. Robert Tod» "After the 
Acquisitions Continuing Challenge»" Harvard Business Review. 
March-April 19̂ 9. p. 97.
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new policies will be resentful and resistant to this new 
authority. Therefore the nature of reporting relationships 
set up between parent and acquired company along with organi­
zational responsibility and control systems both before and 
after merger negotiations, have a dominant influence on 
merger success.
In a survey involving 2,815 mergers, 36 per cent of 
the responding chief executives felt that insufficient infor­
mation had been obtained about the acquired company* s manage­
ment operations and 26 per cent indicated that they had either
ignored or minimized integration problems until the deal was
26closed. Therefore it is important for communication to 
exist between companies negotiating a merger, from the outset 
of the merger, through successful post-merger integration.
2<̂Carl Rieser, "When the Crowd Goes One Way, Litton 
Goes the Other," Fortune. May I963, p. 91.
26R. J. Bolund, "Merger Planning— How Much Weight Do 
Personnel Factors Carry?" Personnel. March 1970, p. 8.
CHAPTER III
HISTORY OP LITTON INDUSTRIES, INC.
Litton Industries, Inc. is a highly diversified cor­
poration having assets of approximately one billion dollars. 
Litton*s products cover a wide spectrum ranging from office 
equipment to shipbuilding. It was one of the fastest grow­
ing corporations during the 1960s, having gi^wn 30,000 times
27since its beginning over fifteen years ago.
Litton was originally incorporated in November, 1953t
28as Electro Dynamics Corporation. Its original product was 
microwave tubes, but in the four years after 1953» Litton 
acquired 10 electronics companies.All Litton*s initial 
mergers were with small, little-known companies, some of 
vdiich were insolvent at the time of acquisition.In 1958, 
Litton reached a respectable sise for an electronics firm 
but its sales were not large enough to classify it as a large
^^"What Happened at Litton?" Newsweek. February 12,
1968, p. 72.
28John Sherman Porter, Ed., Moody*s Industrial Manu­
al— American and Foreign. (New York; D. B. McCriden, 196?) 
p. 3074.
^Rieser, "Crowd Goes One Way," Fortune. p. 115.
^^illiam B. Harris, "Litton Shoots for the Moon," 
Fortune. April 1958, p. 115.
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corporation. In 1958• Litton initiated an acquisition policy 
which eventually included over 50 companies and over $1 bil­
lion in assets.
The first major diversification for Litton was the 
acquisition of the Monroe Calculation Machine Company in 
1958.^^ The acquisition of Monroe more than doubled the 
size of Litton and from the Monroe acquisition# Litton went 
on to acquire firms of various size and diversified into 
numerous different fields. The major acquisitions of Litton 
are listed and discussed in Chapters IV and V.
The extent of Litton*s diversification is best 
described by explaining the structure under which Litton 
and its subsidiaries operate. Litton is divided into vari­
ous business groups# some of which are further subdivided 
into divisions. The Business Equipment Group# the Systems 
Group# the Professional Services and Equipment Group# the 
Components Group# and the Industrial Transportation Systems 
Group are the major divisions of Litton.The organiza­
tional structure of Litton is illustrated in Figure 1.
Growth Record of Litton 
Industries. Inc.
Litton Industries# Inc. sustained a remarkable growth 
record for the first fourteen years of its existence. Table 4 
illustrates Litton's growth by showing sales# net income# and
^̂ Porter# Moody's Industrial Manual, p. 2650.
Fig. 1. The organization of Litton Industries* Inc. as 
shown in Moody * s Industrial Man- 
ual. 1968, p. 2649.
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TABXS »
COMPARATIVE GROWTH FIGURES FOR LITTON 
INDUSTRIES, INC. SINCE 1955
Year
Sales 
(in Thousands}
Sales(in
Thousands)
Earnings 
Per Share Assets
1955 8,774 436 .44 7,647
1956 14,768 1,019 .97 10,826
1957 27,987 1,806 1.51 16,823
1958 82,655 3,702 2.13 57,750
1959 124,619 5,975 3.24* 83,254
i960 187,761 7,454 1.76** 119,004
1961 250,114 10,158 2.77** 172,771
1962 393.807 16,315 2.84 269,491
1963 553,146 23,296 2.70** 354,945
1964 686,135 29,767 3.13 423,697
1965 915,574 39,752 2.42 630,023
1966 1,172,233 55,614 2.46** 742,535
1967 1,778,801 83,199 2.63 1,088,351
1968 1,855,007 58,456 1.80 1,207,876
1969 2,176,600 82,258 2.26 1,580,306
1970 2,404,300 68,751 1.81 1,934,012
1971 2,446,100 50,003 1.27 1,976,038
SOURCEI John Sherman Porter, Ed., Moodv's Industrial
Manual— American and Foreign (New York» D. B. McCriden, 
1955 through 1971).
*After special income tax credit.
♦♦Adjusted for 2 for 1 stock split i960» I963» 19661 
also 2 for 1/2 per cent stock dividend in I96I.
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assets from 1955 to 1971. Earnings per share for each year 
is listed in order to demonstrate Litton's profitability 
during that time period. It should be noted that 2 for 1 
stock splits occurred in i960, 1963, and I966, and since 
1961 over $100 million in stock dividends was declared.
These stock dividends must be taken into consideration when 
considering the earnings per share data in Table 4.
The increase in sales and profits by Litton during 
the 1960s was accompanied by a relatively high price/eamings 
ratio (Table 5). The feasibility of any acquisition program 
(other than the relatively rare cash acquisition) depends 
primarily upon the maintenance of a high price/eamings ratio 
that will allow the buyer to offer a premium to the seller 
and still realize an increase in earnings per share through 
the acquisition.^^ As compared to other conglomerates and 
some single-industry companies, Litton was able to maintain 
a high price/eamings ratio during the merger active years 
from 1964 to 1966.
In 1968, Litton experienced its first slowdown in 
profit growth. Although sales were up by $76 million, pro­
fits and eamings per share were down considerably. Litton 
blamed the slowdown in profitability on the Business Equip­
ment Group which experienced delays, strikes, and lower than
33lbid., p. 3064.
James B. Boulde _
Model," Business Horizons. February 19%, p. 22.
n, "Merger Negotiations: A Decision
TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE PRICEAaRNINGS RATIO HISTORY 
OF CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES 1964-1968
Company
High-Low High-Low High-Low High-Low High-Low
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Litton 28-24 30-23 33-29 41-32 42-39
Walter Kidde 26-23 26-21 28-22 22-21 21-20
I.T.T, 21-20 20-18 20-18 23-20 23-22
Gulf We stem 15-14 14-12 14-11 14-12 16-13
Indian Head 14-13 13-11 11- 8 16— 8 17-16
Ogden 13-11 11-10 12- 9 19-10 22-20
Textron 13-11 15-13 17-15 23-17 24-23
Ling-Temco-Vought 9— 8 15-10 16-11 15-11 14-13
wo\
SOURCEI Fortune. November 1969, p. 152.
NOTE I Prlce/Bamlngs Ratio>i The msurket price of a stock divided by its latest available or estimated eamings per share.
Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, conglomerates do not in general 
have especially high price-eamings ratios. Of the p/e's presented here, only Litton 
has had a consistently high multiple, and even its figures have been lower than those 
of many single-industry conipanies.
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expected sales. Corporate officers at the time felt the 
prospects for the future were very good once the slump in 
business activity was overcome and the impact of the depeir- 
ture of several key executives overcome.Even if Litton . 
experienced a slowdown in growth, the fact remained that dur­
ing the years 1958-1968, Litton was very active in acquiring 
and merging with other companies. Litton's acquisitions 
during the 1960s provide a basis for the study of the effects 
of mergers upon management personnel and a background against 
which fear of displacement, management friction, and execu­
tive motivation have been examined.
Policies of Litton Industries, Inc. 
tn Relation to Management
Litton's policy concerning corporate growth involved 
the acquisition of companies with special expertise as a 
means of attaining profitability in a new field. Litton 
followed the same policy for its retention of executives.
In a policy statement made in 1966, Litton listed three rules 
that it followed when considering an acquisition. These rules 
wereI (1) the company must fit with Litton's product planning 
and market planning, (2) the company must have strong manage­
ment, and, (3) the initial capital outlay, potential return
^^"What Happened at Litton?" Newsweek, February 12, 
1968, p. 77.
^̂ "Littoni B-School for Conglomerates," Business 
Week. December 2, 196?, p. 88.
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on investment and other financial criteria must be right.
The order in which management is listed in the above rules 
indicated the importance that Litton places on competent 
management in an acquisition that it undertook. The acqui­
sition policy seemed to be directly related to Litton's 
concept of conglomerate management. Therefore, Litton's 
management concept was based upon the idea that talented 
general managers, applying modern management techniques, 
could effectively oversee diverse businesses in which they 
had no specific experience.^®
Litton's acquisition policies required strong manage­
ment as a criterion for any diverse acquisition, resulting 
in less specific experience being required of the general 
management which would oversee the new acquisition. This 
policy held true, of course, if the strong management of the 
company being acquired was given enough authority to continue 
the efficient operation of the subsidiary. The ex-president 
of Litton, Charles Ash, viewed Litton as a collection of 
related small companies rather than as one large companŷ
He considered Litton to be a number of independent $10 million 
to $100 million companies rather than a one billion dollar 
company.
3?Jack B. Weiner, "The Management of Litton Indus­
tries," Dun's Review and Modem Industry. May 1966, p. 35.
^®William S. Rukeyser, "Litton Down to Barth," 
Fortune » April 1968, p. 186.
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Within the network of decentralized divisions, Litton 
measured its manager's efficiency by their return on gross 
assets. Depreciation was not considered, and the managers 
were charged with the cost of their machines. Litton's mea­
sure of efficiency encouraged managers to keep production 
equipment only as long as it was economically advantageous 
to do so. Using return on gross assets as a measure of 
efficiency aleo encouraged the managers to return any un­
necessary cash. Litton's main controls consisted of a finan­
cial plan which was presented yearly to the general management 
and division heads and updated quarterly. A return on gross 
assets report, opportunity identification meetings, monthly 
statements, and weekly statements of cash flow positions were 
also utilized as part of the control system. Litton's ex­
president Charles Ash statedt
When you have information flowing, the problem of 
exerting control takes care of itself. You have 
to step in when changes have to be made. Control 
shouldn't mean domination or imposition. If you 
have good flow of information, control tends to be part and parcel of communication. 39
The organization of Litton then, combined centralization 
where major investment decisions were concerned with decen­
tralization in day-to-day operations. In addition, Litton's 
management wanted its people to submit all the ideas they had, 
trying to maintain an atmosphere of easy flow of information.
39Reiser, "Crowd Goes One Way," Fortune. p. 226.
ko
but eliminating those ideas which martagement determined non- 
feasible.^®
p. 182.
"How Litton Keaps It Up," Fortune. September 1966,
CHAPTER IV
HORIZONTAIAEHTICAL mergers of LITTON 
INDUSTRIES. INC. FROM 1958 TO 1968
Litton's first wave of acquisitions was composed of 
small electronic firms mdiich specialized in particular seg­
ments of this greatly expanding industry. In Litton's early 
years, the common criterion among the companies acquired 
appeared to be the presence of an advanced technology that 
might be applied for commercial purposes. Most of the com­
panies acquired during Litton's first five years were small 
electronic firms selling primarily to the military.^
Chapter IV consists of an examination of the horizon­
tal and vertical mergers of Litton from 1958 to I968. In 
addition, there is a breakdown on the disposition of the top 
executives after each merger. Since horizontal/vertical 
mergers have different characteristics than would be the case 
with mergers of a conglomerate nature, each horizontal/vertical 
merger is considered separately in Chapter IV to point out com­
mon characteristics and trends. The following companies are 
the horizontal/vertical acquisitions made by Litton in chrono­
logical order.
Federal Trade Commission. Economic Report On Corpor­
ate Mergers. I969, p. 562.
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Maryland Electronic Manufacturing Corporation (MEMC)
The BŒMC was acquired in 1958 and was a horizontal 
merger since Litton was still primarily a producer of elec­
tronic equipment. The MEMC was not very large, having only 
350 employees. The total number of executives was nine, 
including the purchasing agent, the chief engineer, and the 
production manager. Of the original nine executives of the 
MEMC in late 1958, only the president, William R. Mase, still 
remained with Litton in 1961.̂  The MEMC merger did involve 
a significant change in personnel within two years after the 
merger. The fact that the president remained does indicate 
that he was either considered a competent manager by Litton 
or he retained a significant financial interest to warrant 
his retention. The retention of the president in the MEMC 
merger contrasts with other mergers where the chief execu­
tive is the first to be replaced.
Westrex Corporation 
Litton acquired the Westrex Corporation in 1958.^
The acquisition of Westrex is considered a horisontsd merger 
since Westrex*s products would be grouped generally into
2Standard and Poor's Corporation, Poor's Register of 
Directors and Executives. (New York: Standard and Poor's, 
1958), p. 85 »̂ hereinafter abbreviated Poor's Register.
^Ibid., 1961, p. k05.
4Porter, Moodv's Industrial Manual, p. I392.
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electronic products. However, the fact that Westrex produced 
sound recording equipment, sound reproducing equipment, and 
communication equipment made the Westrex merger more of a 
diversification than was the case with the MSMC merger. 
Westrex eventucdly becsme a division of the Professional 
Services and Equipment Group rather than the Systems Group. 
Litton's policy regarding top management was basically as 
with the MEMC merger; by I96I, only one of Westrex*s top 
executives, the vice-president, remained with the company.^
Poly Scientific Corporation (PSC)
The PSC was acquired in 1962 and was a small company 
with sales of $2-$3 million and 320 employees.* The PSC 
acquisition is a horizontal merger in which the executives 
of the company appeared to be completely replaced. Of the 
eight executives of the company listed in 1962, none held 
positions important enough in 1964 to be listed in Poor's 
Register.
Winchester Electsnics.Incorporated (WE)
Winchester Electronics was acquired in I963 and is
a horizontal merger. The company produced electrical connec-
!
tors and component parts, had annual sales of $3-$6 million, 
and employed 455 personnel.? The WE company later became
^Poor's Register. I96I, p. 3094.
*Ibld., 1962, p. 1276.
?Ibld., 1963, p. 1598.
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8part of the Components Group of Litton. Again there was 
a significant change in the personnel structure among the 
top executives. Of the eight executives listed in I963» 
only the chief engineer remained with the company in 1965.*
Adler Electronics Incorporated (AE)
Adler Electronics was also acquired in I963 and is 
a horizontal merger, although it was diverse to some extent. 
Adler Electronics produced communications equipment and was 
later incorporated into the Systems Group of Litton. Adler 
Electronics was a large company, having sales of over $35 
million.Although AE was reorganized to a large extent, 
quite a few of the executives remained with Litton in what 
appears to be equivalent or higher positions than held before 
the merger.
Of the top six executives, including the president, 
vice-president, and the controller, only the vice-president 
for planning, Harry Adler, was no longer listed as being 
with Litton in I965. Of the remaining executives, including 
the director of administrative services and the personnel 
manager, only one remained.Although there were no signi­
ficant changes among the top executives of the AE company, 
there were changes involving jobs which were easily affected
M̂oodv’s, 1968, p. 2649.
^Poor's Register. I965, p. 1659.
p. 2875.
lllbid.
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by centralization with the parent company (e.g., an existing 
personnel manager at Litton absorbing his counterpart in the 
Adler company).
/ Clifton Precision Products 
Company (GPP)
The CCP company was acquired in late 19&3 and is 
another horizontal merger. The CCP company produced servo­
mechanisms and other types of electronic equipment and had 
annual sales of between $9 and $12 million. After the mer­
ger, the personnel structure of the company was significantly 
altered. In 19̂ 5, only one of the originsü. six executives 
listed in 1963 remained with the company. The remaining
12executive was the vice-president of sales, Thomas W. Shoop.
Fitchburg Paper Company (FP)
The FP company, acquired in 1964, was involved in 
specialty printing, and had annual sales of $15*$25 million 
and hired 650 employees.Although the FP company was 
diverse from Litton" s main line of business, it was similar 
to the Eureka Specialty Printing Company and the Times Fac­
simile Corporation, both subsidiaries of Litton at the time 
of the merger. After the merger, Litton retained most of 
the executives of the FP company. Of the fourteen executives 
listed in 1964, only the chairman, George R. Wallace, and the
12poor"s Register, I963, p. 2875. 
1964, p, 580.
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vice-president for purchasing» Vernon C. Davis, were no 
longer with the Litton corporation in 1966.̂ *
Alvev-Ferguson Comoanv fA-F)
Th% A-F Company was a producer of conveyor systems 
employing 250 personnel.The merger occurred in I966 and 
is a horizontal merger since it involved a product similar 
to that produced by the Hewitt-Robins company of the Indus­
trial Transportation Systems Group. In the A-P Company 
merger, the executives of the acquired comps^ were almost 
entirely replaced by Litton. In I968, only two out of the 
original ten executives listed in I966 were still with 
Litton.
Maverick-Clark Company (M-C)
The M-C Company merger also occurred in I966 and was 
another example of a horizontal merger. Maverick-Clark pro­
duced office equipment, office supplies, and did specialty
18printing and lithography. Only four executives were listed 
with the company in 1966, and by I968 none were listed with 
the Litton Corporation. The M-C merger is another example
1966, p. 598.
, p. 48. 
l*Moodv's. 1968, p. 2649.
^Tpoor's Register. 1968, p. 2581.
®̂Ibid., 1966, p. 1003.
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of the personnel of an acquired company being totally dis­
placed by a parent company.
Electra Motors. Incorporated (EM)
The EM merger occurred in I966 and was a vertical 
merger because Electra produced electric motors, generators, 
gear reducers, and fluid couplings which are used by various 
components of the Industrial Transportation Group at Litton. 
The EM company had 350 employees and annual sales of $6-$9 
million. The EM merger, like the Maverick-Clark merger, 
resulted in the displacement of the top executives. After 
the EM merger, none of the seven executives listed in I965 
held a position in I968 to be listed in Poor's Register.
McCray Refrigerator Company
The McCray Company was a producer of meat, dairy, and
produce cases, freezer cases, walk-in coolers, and reach-in 
20refrigerators. The McCray Company was involved in the same 
general type of business as Streater Industries, Inc. and
with regards to this similarity, can be considered a horizon-
21tal merger. Here again, after only two years, most of the 
executives disappeared after the merger. In I968, only one 
of the executives listed in I966 was still with the company—  
the president, J. W. Krall.^^
p. 503. °̂Ibid., p. 1009. ^̂ Ibid. 
Ẑ lbid., 1968, p. 2*75.
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Sturgis Business Forms. Inc.
The Sturgis company was the last acquisition by 
Litton in I966 and is considered a vertical merger. Sturgis, 
Inc. produced Isales books and autographic register forms and 
tab forms. The business of Sturgis is considered vertical 
because it is more of a supplier to the divisions of the 
Business Equipment Group at Litton than a producer of a like 
product. Although there were some additions to the list of 
executives in 1968, only one of the I966 executives was no 
longer listed with Litton.
Kester Solder Company (KS)
The KS Company was acquired in I967 and could best 
be described as vertical in nature. In the KS merger there 
was a 50 per cent displacement of executives between I967 
and 1969. The president, a vice-president, the secretary, 
the controller, and one of the plant managers had been re­
placed by 1969.̂ *
Chainvevor Corporation 
The Chainveyor company was a producer of conveyor 
systems and the merger with Litton in I967 was of the hori­
zontal type since Hewitt-Robins was already producing this 
type of product. Chainveyor had annusd sales of $l-$3 million 
and employed 100 personnel.Unlike many other horizontal
Ẑ Ibld., p. 1968. I969, p. 920.
^^Poor*8 Register. I969, p. 379.
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mergers by Litton» there was not a significant change in 
personnel after the merger. Of the ten executives listed 
in 1967, only the chairman» John B. Haven» was no longer 
with the company in I969.
' Summary
As pointed out in Chapter IV» after the Litton (of 
California) acquisition brought in the magnetron tube for 
radar and microwave » Litton purchased firms in the "compon­
ent group" producing electronic terminals» transformers » 
color TV tubes» coils and transformers» and electron tubes.
In the ensuing years» further acquisitions were made of 
companies producing slip rings» electronic connectors» 
synchros and servomotors.^? In addition» Chapter IV has 
presented information concerning the disposition of manage­
ment personnel in the horizontal and vertical mergers accom­
plished by Litton since 1958.
The percentage loss of personnel for the mergers 
discussed in the chapter is summarized in Table 6. By exam­
ining Table 6» it can be seen that the loss of personnel for 
horizontal/vertical mergers is high. In nine of the examples» 
the personnel change exceeded 80 per cent. It is evident
2*Ibld., p. 379.
^Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Cor- 
porate Mergers, I969» p. 562.
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE LOSS OF PERSONNEL FOR HORIZONTAL/ 
VERTICAL TYPE MERGERS
Company Acquired
No. of 
Executives 
Listed
No. of 
Executives 
Retained
% Loss of 
Personnel
Maryland Electronics 9 1 b9
Westrex Corp. 14 1 93
Poly Scientific Co. 8 0 100
Winchester Electronics a 1 87
Adler Electronics 12 6 50
Clifton Precision 
Products 6 1 83
Fitchburg Paper Co. 14 12 8
Electra Motors Co. 8 0 100
Alvey-Ferguson Co. 10 2 80
Maverick Clark Co. 4 0 100
McCray Refrigerator 10 1 90
Sturgis Newport Busi­
ness Forms 5 4 20
Kester Solder Co. 10 5 50
Chainveyor Corp. 10 9 10
CHAPTER V
DIVERSE MERGERS OF LITTON 
INDUSTRIES. INC.
PROM 1958-1968
Litton'8 initial goal wsts to achieve a position in 
advanced electronics so that it could participate in mili­
tary and civilian electronic markets. As indicated in 
Chapter IV, Litton endeavored to bring together companies 
engaged in technical operations in military electronics with 
a view to extending its operations to civilian markets. It 
was shown in Chapter IV that while Litton's acquisitions 
were still characterized by technological considerations, an 
increasing number had no cohesive relationship to Litton's 
traditional operations.^
The more important diverse or conglomerate mergers 
made by Litton from 1958 to I968 are examined as the vertical/ 
horizontal were in Chapter IV. The diverse acquisitions made 
by Litton in chronological order are included below.
Monroe Calculating Machine Co.
In 1958 Litton diversified into the business equip­
ment field by acquiring the Monroe Calculating Machine
1Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on 
Mergers. 1969# p. 559.
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Company. The Monroe acquisition was quite a significant
merger for Litton since Monroe was larger than Litton at the
time of the merger, Monroe*s products were calculating,
2addition, account, and data processing machines.
At the time of the merger, Litton was producing
/military computers and, as a result, had devised products 
that seemed adaptable to civilian markets. Monroe appeared 
to be an excellent vehicle for the marketing of these pro­
ducts; Monroe turned to Litton because it was lagging behind 
in the industry and wanted Litton as a source of new products 
and ideas.̂
Litton*s policy toward Monroe's executives was to 
incorporate them into top executive positions at Litton 
while they remained in management positions at Monroe. The 
chairman of Monroe, Alfred Connable, remained chairmcm after 
the merger and also became a director on the board of Litton. 
The president, Fred Sullivan, retained his position and be­
came a vice-president and director at Litton. The vice- 
president and controller of Monroe, William McKenna, retain­
ed his position and later became the treasurer and control­
ler of Litton. By 1960 there were only two officers at or 
below the vice-president level who no longer held their 
positions at Monroe.
M̂oody's. 1958, p. 1217.
^"Rival for the Giantst Litton Industries," Business 
Week. November 23, 1957, p. 3̂ .
^Poor's Register. I96I, pp. 2037-2984.
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Times Facsimile Corporation 
The Times Facsimile Corporation was acquired in 1959 
from the New York Times Corporation. A relatively small 
company» it employed 250 and produced reproduction equip­
ment and specialty printing produkts.^ None of the five 
executives listed in Poor's Register before the merger were 
still employed by Times Facsimile in I96I, However» three 
of these changes can be explained. The chairman of Times 
Facsimile in 1959» Arthur Sulzberger» was also the chairman 
of the New York Times Corporation. The president» Orvil 
Dryf008 » was also president and director of the New York 
Times» and the treasurer» Francis Cox» was also the trea­
surer of the New York Times.^ As could be expected» all 
three executives remained with the parent company» the New 
York Times. *
Cole Steel Equipment Company 
The Cole Steel Company was acquired in I96I. At the 
time of its acquisition it had sales in the $9-$12 million 
range and produced office furniture and equipment. ̂ The 
company was eventually incorporated into the Office Furnish­
ings Division of the Business Equipment Group. Of the eight 
officers of the company listed in I96I» six of them remained
^Poor's Register. 1958, p. 1082.
*Ibid., 1961, pp. 2240-2982. 
fibid., p. 322.
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with the company by 1963• Only, the secretary, Sidney Gelder, 
and the personnel director, Arthur Dale, were no longer with
Ûthe company. In the case of the personnel director, his
position was an ideal candidate for centralization and that
accomplishment explains why he was displaced.
\
Eureka Specialty Printing Company 
The Eureka Company was also acquired in 1961, and 
was relatively diverse in nature. The company employed 900 
personnel and produced poster and trading stamps, seals, 
coupons, gummed paper, safety paper, and stationery supplies. 
Annual sales for the company were in the $15-$25 million 
range. Poor's Register listed thirteen executives with the 
company in 1961, and by 1963, all but three remained with 
the company.^ The secretary and treasurer, James W. Reid, 
the purchasing agent, Lorenz Zeidler, and the chief engineer, 
T. E. Bradley were the three executives no longer with the 
company in 1963.̂ ^
Aero Service Corporation 
The Aero Service Corporation was acquired in I96I and 
represents the first major component of what is now the Pro­
fessional Services and Equipment Group at Litton.Aero 
Service was primarily involved in aerial photography and map 
making. The Aero merger is classed as a diverse acquisition
p. 368. p. 452. l°Ibld., p. 453.
^^Moodv’s. 1968, p. 2649.
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since Litton had nothing similar to this type of business 
prior to the merger. The basic personnel structure of the 
company did not change after the merger except that the
chairman and president, Virgil Kaufman, was no longer with
12the company in I963. The position of chairman was taken 
by the executive vice-president, George Strawbridge, and the 
position of president was assumed by the vice-president for 
marketing, Thomas O'Malley. Other changes occurred, but 
these changes only involved the shifting of personnel between 
various jobs.
Ingals Shipbuilding Corporation 
The Ingals merger occurred in I96I and represented 
a diversification into a completely different type market. 
Ingals became a major division of the Industrial Transporta­
tion Systems Group and has become a major producer of both 
defense and industrial shipping.Litton considered Ingals 
to be well managed and by I963 there had been no change in 
the officers or directors of the company.
McKieman-Terrv Corporation 
The McKieman-Terry acquisition occurred in I962. At 
the time of the merger, McKieman-Terry produced material 
handling and marine equipment, pile hammers, hydraulics, and
^^Poor's Register. I963, p. 3I.
^̂ Moody's. 1968, p. 2649. 
^̂ Poor's Register, I963, p. 738.
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gate and bridge operating machinery. After the merger» 
however» Litton changed the structure of the company to some 
extent and by 1963» McKieman-Terry was also producing radar 
and sonar electro-mechanical actuators » aircraft catapults 
and arresting engines » and nuclear service devices. There 
was also a large change in the personnel structure after the 
merger. Litton reduced the number of top executives in the 
McKieman-Terry Corporation from thirteen executives to five 
executives. In addition» R. W. McFall and W. £. McKenna» 
both of whom were officers of Litton before the merger» be­
came officers of McKiernan-Terry.
The introduction of McFall and McKenna into the 
McKieman management hierarchy is the first example of the 
placement of Litton officers into positions in an acquired 
company in which the officers have had no experience. The 
personnel that remained included the more important of the 
officers before the merger. The chairman of the board, the 
president, and three of the vice-presidents made up the five 
surviving executives.
Streater Industries. Inc.
Streater Industries was acquired in 1964. The com­
pany produced store fixtures and had recorded sales of $9-$12
17million and employed 6OO personnel. The merger was a
^̂ Ibid.» p. 868. l^Poor's Register. I963» p. 925. 
1964, p. 1450.
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diverse acquisition although it fit well into the Business 
Equipment Group. As was Litton*s policy in previous diverse 
acquisitions, the personnel structure of the company remain­
ed virtually the same as before the merger. As late as I967, 
the executives of Streater Industries were the same as they 
were in 1964,
;
Roval-McBee Corporation 
Royal-McBee was acquired in I965 and was Litton's 
first entry into the typewriter market. The company was 
renamed Royal Typewriter Company, Inc. and was reorganized 
to some extent. The president of Royal-McBee was replaced, 
although he remained a director, and William McKenna, an 
officer of both Monroe and Litton, became the president of 
Royal. Since Monroe was a producer of business machines, 
this was probably not inconsistent with his experience, con­
sidering the level of his job.
Three other officers were replaced and several new 
positions added by Litton. Seven of the original eleven 
officers retained their positions or were promoted after the
IQmerger.  ̂ The retention of most of the Royal-McBee execu­
tives indicates that Litton felt it bought a well managed 
compcmy and attempted to improve it by adding one of their 
own highly regarded managers.
1967, p. l‘»98.
19Ibid., 1966. p. 1357.
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The organizational changes in the Royal-KcBee Cor­
poration were made because the company was not organized
20into profit centers in accordance with Litton*s policies. 
Before the merger# the company was divided into functional 
divisions. For example# there was a marketing division and 
a foreign sales division, McKenna divisionalized the company 
into "natural** divisions# giving etch division manager inter­
national responsibility for his division. The natural divi­
sions were reorganized according to product instead of 
function. Basically# the changes that were made were struc­
tural changes# and the Royal-McBee personnel were utilized
21in the new positions. The reorganization could not be 
considered a large scale reduction of personnel.
Hewitt-Robins Incorporated (H-R)
Hewitt-Robins was acquired in 1965* The H-R company 
produced conveyer systems# a product which was completely 
diverse from anything Litton was producing at the time. In 
the H-R merger# as was the case in most other diverse acqui­
sitions# the top executives were virtually left alone after 
the merger. Because Litton had no experience with conveyer 
systems# strong management was a prerequisite for the merger. 
As was the case with Monroe# some of the executives of Hewitt-
20Jack B. Weiner# "The Management of Litton Indus­
tries," Dun*s Review and Modem Industry. May 1966# pp. 32-33.
Zllbid., p. 53.
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Robins were made officers of Litton. These executives were
made officers of Litton. These executives were Ellis Gardner
22and Austin Goodyear.
The H-R merger actually took place because of a 
threat from a Hewitt-Robins stockholder of gaining control 
of the company and changing thê  policies and goals then pur­
sued by H-R management. Austin Goodyear» president of Hewitt- 
Robins» called officials of Litton to ask if they were inter­
ested in a merger, Litton decided almost immediately that 
they were» and within a very short time period» Litton had 
made most of the plans for accomplishing the merger. Hewitt- 
Robins was satisfied with the deal because Litton*s policies 
concerning grovrth were along the same lines as their own 
policies at the time.^^
Stouffer Foods Corporation 
Stouffer Foods was acquired by Litton in I967 and was 
engaged in preparing» selling» and serving cooked food through 
a chain of restaurants and motels emd through retail outlets. 
In addition» Stouffer was engaged in the food management busi-
2 iiness. The Stouffer Foods merger is another example of a
^̂ Poor's Register. I967. p. 935.
"Anatomy of an Acquisition»" Dun's Review and Modern 
Industry» May i960» pp. 65-68. 
oilstandard.and Poor's Corporation» Standard Corpora­
tion Descriptions, (Vol. 29» No. 13» New York# Standard and 
Poor's Corporation» Publishers» April-May I968)» p. 7505.
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diverse merger and there was no change in the personnel make
up of the company from before the merger in I967 to 1970.
The chairman of the board and president# Vernon Stouffer#
also became a director of Litton.
Litton was particularly interested in the management
food service division and the frozen prepared food division
of Stouffer. They were interested in combining the various
food divisions with the^r microwave oven# which was being
produced by the Atherton Division of the Professional Serv-
26 'ices and Equipment Group.
Eureka X-Rav Tube Corporation
The Eureka company was also acquired in I967 and was
incorporated into the Professional Services and Equipment
Group. At the time of the merger# Eureka*s sales were at
the $l-$3 million msurk and employment was approximately 90
people.Up to 1970, there were no changes in the execu-
28tive structure of the Eureka company.
Summarv
The diverse mergers executed by Litton Industries 
from 1958 to 1968 have been discussed in this chapter. As 
indicated by these mergers# Litton in the latter part of the
^^Poor's Register. I969, p. 753* 
^̂ Moodv*s. 1968# p. 2649.
^̂ Poor's Register. I967, p. 452.
®̂Ibld., 1969, p. 601.
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1950e endeavored to move into the business machines and 
equipment industry. During the same period, to complement 
its electronic activities, Litton undertook the acquisition 
of firms in the field of professional services and equip­
ment. The next stage in its acquisition program was obtain­
ing larger firms in the heavy industry field. Most recently, 
Litton has moved into the educational systems fields, while
continuing its acquisition program in industrial systems 
29and equipment. ̂
The same criteria used in examining the horizontal/ 
vertical mergers listed in Chapter IV was used in the exami­
nation of the mergers in Chapter V. However, as illustrated 
in Table 7, the percentage loss of personnel for the diverse 
mergers is different. The percentage change in personnel 
among top executives is smsill as compaured to the changes 
associated with the horizontal/vertical mergers. In the 
acquisitions examined, only one resulted in a personnel loss 
of 80 per cent or more. A logical explanation can be given 
for this one high displacement percentage. A majority of the 
officers of the Times Facsimile Corporation were also officers 
of the parent company, the New York Times. Therefore they 
would not have been expected to retain their positions with 
the Times Facsimile Corporation under the circumstances.
In addition, several of the diverse acquisitions 
illustrate Litton*s merger policy of obtaining well managed
20̂Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on 
Mergers. 1969, p. 559.
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE LOSS OF PERSONNEL FOR 
DIVERSE TYPE MERGERS
Company Acquired
No. of 
Executives 
Listed
No. of 
Executives 
Retained
% Loss of 
Personnel
Monroe Calculating 
Machine Co. 13 11 11
Times Facsimile Co. 0 100
(40)#
Cole Steel Equip­ment Co. 8 6 25
Eureka Specialty 
Printing Co. 13 10 23
Aero Service Corp. 16 15 6
Ingals Shipbuild­
ing Co. 12 12 0
McKieman-Terry Co. 13 5 61
Streater Indus­
tries, Inc. 7 7 0
Royal-McBee Corp. 11 7 6
Hewitt-Robbins Co. 4 4 0
Stouffer Foods Co. 17 17 0
Eureka X-Ray Tube Co. 6 6 0
♦Three of the five top executives of the Times Fac­
simile Co. were also high officers with the parent company, 
the New York Times Corporation. They remained with the New 
York Times Corporation and are not considered displaced by 
the merger.
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companies. For example, the Litton/^onroe merger seems to 
have followed the rules set forth by Litton concerning 
merger negotiations. Litton thought that Monroe was well 
managed as pointed out by the fact that practically all of 
its officers at Monroe retained their positions, and some 
even became officers at Litton. According to Mace and 
Montgomery, authors of Management Problems of Corporate 
Acquisitions, a majority of Litton*s diverse mergers are 
those in which the company being acquired possessed strong 
management talent which the acquiring company felt would 
help strengthen the parent company.
^̂ Mace and Montgomery, Management Problems, p. 9.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter I was devoted to examining the background of 
merger activity in the United States and discussing the 
three major merger typest (1) horizontal, (2) vertical, and 
(3) conglomerate or diverse. As stated in Chapter I, the 
purpose of this paper was to study the impact of mergers on 
executive displacement. In addition, three basic questions 
(see page 14) concerning executive displacement were asked. 
Two of these questions were general in nature, while the 
other one pertains specifically to the mergers of Litton 
Industries, Inc. Chapter VI restates these three questions 
and draws conclusions based on the research involved in 
examining the mergers and acquisitions of Litton Industries.
Chapter II was devoted to answering the question of 
what problems could be expected with respect to the utiliza­
tion and retention of personnel when a merger or acquisition 
was considered. The basic problems found were: (1) fear of 
displacement on the part of the executives of the businesses 
being acquired, (2) friction between executives of the parent 
company and the company being acquired, and (3) the motiva­
tion of the executive before and after the merger had occur­
red.
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Chapter III contained a general background of Litton 
Industries and description of Litton*s' general policies 
toward management. The background information on Litton*s 
growth and management policies during the 1960s was used to 
analyse the mergers executed by Litton in Chapter IV and V. 
The mergers of Litton from 1958 to I968 were examined in 
Chapters IV and V in order to determine what happened to 
the top executives after a merger occurred. The horizontal 
and vertical mergers were considered to be one basic cate­
gory and were listed in Chapter IV. Chapter V contained the 
diverse or conglomerate mergers executed by Litton in the 
same time period. ^
Personnel Problems 
In considering the first question (personnel prob- 
lens associated with mergers) the basic problems were re­
stated and conclusions were drawn based on information obtain­
ed from analyzing the mergers of Litton. Also» some "text­
book" opinions which have been offered concerning the handl­
ing of mergers and acquisitions were viewed and an attempt 
was made to determine if Litton*s actions were consistent 
with these opinions.
Fear of Displacement 
Fear of displacement is difficult to measure and to 
overcome. As indicated by Litton*s mergers, Litton estab­
lished a reputation of acquiring well managed companies and 
leaving the personnel structures intact sifter the merger.
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Litton*8 non-displacement policy was the case in many of the 
mergers studied, although there were several exceptions among 
the smaller, earlier mergers. Of the mergers examined, there 
was no evidence of large sccde displacement of personnel that 
would create executive fear as was the case of Pedders Corpor­
ation's acquisition of Norge or White Consolidated*s acquisi­
tion of Kelvinator and Blaw-Knox.^
Management Friction 
The problem of friction among personnel when two com­
panies are suddenly merged is one of the more serious problems 
associated with merger activity. Where two companies have 
hetergeneous products and where little or no physical or oper­
ating consolidation is planned, separate corporate policies
2can be continued without change. In addition, executives of 
acquired companies with direct line responsibilities are less 
subject to displacement than executives in staff capacities. 
For example, the sales manager and the manufacturing manager 
are less likely to be displaced than their financial, legal, 
or public relations counterparts. The reason is simply that 
the operating executives are needed to run the organization 
while the staff functions may very readily be absorbed into 
the existing staff of the parent company.^
p. 51.
^"But What About People?" Newsweek, p. 84. 
^ennessy. Acquiring and Merging, p. 228.
^ytmar, "Merger and Executive," Business Horizons.
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Where it is important to bring the people of both 
companies into close continuing contact after a merger# dif­
ferences in personnel or management policies often lead to
iLmanagement friction and to cries of discrimination. In 
some of Litton's earlier mergers# the acquired companies had 
operations similar enough to allow Litton management to play 
an increased role in their policies and operations. As indi­
cated in Table 6 (11 out of 14 mergers) the close operating 
relationships resulted in a relatively high turnover of manage- 
ment personnel, especially those in staff positions. In other 
instances, particularly in Litton*s later mergers# the opera­
tion of the acquired company was diverse enough that Litton 
management did not participate significantly in the management 
of the acquired company. The low management displacement 
indicated by data in Table 7 (10 out of 12 mergers) points 
this finding out.
In conclusion# management friction is less severe 
when the acquired company's product is diverse from the parent 
company's basic purpose. The fact that Litton's divisions 
run their day to day operations with a great deal of autono­
my indicates that there are usually no close controls put on 
the top executives of newly acquired companies which vrould 
cause Emy serious frictions. In 81 per cent of merger fail­
ures# the organizational format (either the reporting rela­
tionships established after the merger or the extent of
. Hennessy, Acquiring and Merging, p. 228.
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autonomy allowed) was disturbed at least once after the mer­
ger was brought about. ̂ The fact that Litton made it a 
policy to acquire competent management and attempted not to 
disburb the established organisational pattern of their acqui­
sitions, helped reduce management friction and keep their 
acquisition failures to a minimum.
Pre/Post-Merger Motivation 
The final personnel problem concerns the ability of 
the parent company to motivate the executive before and after 
the merger takes place. As stated in Chapter II, the surest 
way to achieve corporate objectives after a merger is to 
effectively motivate the management of the new company.^
Even though a company may be acquired for its management 
potential, improper handling of the new personnel may result 
in their loss.
Although some degree of centralization is possible 
in a company with as many diverse subsidiaries as Litton, a 
certain degree of decentralization is necessary if each sub­
sidiary is to run smoothly and efficiently.? Litton's policy 
of decentralization offers responsibility to the top execu­
tives of all the subsidiaries. Litton's methods of evaluating
Pitching, "Mergers Miscarry?" HER, p. 84.
^Leighton and Tod, "Continuing Challenge," HER, p. 97.
?Joel Dean.and Winfield Smith, "The Relationship 
Eetween Profitability and Size," quoted in William W. Alberts 
and Joel £. Segal, Ed., The Corporate Merger. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, I967), p. 4.
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managers by the profits they produce should also motivate 
the managers to produce to the utmost of their abilities.
A strong commitment to measuring managers on the basis of 
the economic performances of their divisions and rewarding 
them generously for good performance tends to develop an 
organisational climate and compensation system that attracts 
competent people and motivates them to expand and improve
otheir operations.
Many chief executives affirm the need to investigate 
personnel-related factors in greater depth during the pre­
merger evaluation stage.^ In a survey of 50 companies 
involved in from one to ten mergers, the companies took the 
following into consideration before merging or acquiring:
(1) evaluating the managers in the new organization against 
the tasks to be accomplished, (2) depth of management talent, 
(3) compatibility of organizational structures, and (4) how 
to motivate the new executives.Since a sound decentral­
ized organization is not possible unless each subsidiary has 
competent management, according to Litton, the easiest method 
of obtaining competent management is to ensure it is there 
before the company is acquired and then ensure it is motivated
QNorman A. Berg, **What*8 New About Conglomerate Man­
agement?" Harvard Business Review. Nov«aber-December I969,
p. 117. "
B̂olund, "Merger Planning," Personnel, p. 8. 
lOlbld.
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properly. This management policy indicates Litton's concern 
for pre-merger evaluation of potential merger candidates and 
their concern for post-merger integration and continuing 
motivation of their managers.
' In final conclusion, a corporation such as Litton can 
effectively expand into fields in which it has no experience 
if the businesses it acquires have strong management and if 
the management is properly motivated. The conclusion is based 
on the fact that during the period I96O-I968, Litton*s man­
agement policies at that time overcame the basic problems of 
fear, friction, and motivation facing companies who attempt 
to achieve growth through the acquisition of other companies.
Extent of Executive Displacement 
The second question to be answered asked what the 
extent of personnel changes were in the mergers accomplished 
by Litton. The amount of executive displacement was covered 
in detail in Chapter IV and V and the results were summarized 
in the comparative bar graphs of Table 8. The percentage 
loss of personnel from i960 to I967 was illustrated graphi­
cally in Table 8. It should be noted that in the most recent 
half of the mergers examined, or those occurring since 1964, 
the average per cent loss was 33 per cent. The average prior 
to 1964 was 56 per cent loss of personnel. The percentage 
loss trend indicated that as Litton grew larger and became 
more diverse, its policy of seeking and retaining strong man­
agement in its mergers grew stronger.
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TABLE 8
COMPARATIVE BAR GRAPHS OF PERCENTAGE 
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Relationship of Merger Type 
to Executive Displacement
The type of merger (horizontal, vertical, or diverse) 
had a great deal to do with the ability of the acquired com­
pany to exist as a separate entity from the parent company. 
Thus the type of merger had a beeuring on the extent of per­
sonnel displacement occurring after a merger. The results 
in the Litton, study ranged from no change at all in many of 
the diverse mergers to a 100 per cent change in some of the 
horizontal mergers (see Tables 6 and 7). As can be seen, 
there was a large difference between the amount of personnel 
change. In fact, the two categories (horizontal/vertical vs. 
diverse) are almost opposite (see Table 8).
The difference in executive displacement can be attri­
buted to the fact that it is more difficult for a company 
executive to accommodate himself to a vertical or horizontal 
merger than to the life in a conglomerate, since there is a 
greater need for autonomy in the latter. An integrated oper­
ating company— unlike a conglomerate— is likely to have a 
full usage of corporate services and controls that it will 
be reluctant to see either duplicated or ignored in a new 
division.As indicated by the Litton study, not until 
Litton began to diversify did the need for autonomy and de­
centralization lower the percentage loss of personnel.
^^Albrook, "Frustrations," Fortune. p. 162.
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The extent to which the management tool can be 
applied also depends upon the type of merger. Litton*s 
acquisition policies did not always agree with its actions.
It is seen that many of the horizontal mergers involved a 
high turnover in top management personnel. By referring to 
the organization of Litton in Chapter III, it can also be 
seen that most of the companies involved in these horizontal/ 
vertical mergers lost their identities and were integrated 
completely into other divisions. In the case of the diverse 
mergers, however, Litton followed its acquisition policy in 
almost every merger examined. There was little change in 
personnel structure of the companies acquired and eight out 
of twelve companies retained their identities as a division 
of Litton. It can be concluded, therefore, that in the case 
of the large, diverse mergers, Litton*s policies should 
avoid executive displacement. In the case of the horizontal/ 
vertical mergers, this conclusion cannot be made.
Acquisitions and mergers are methods of achieving 
corporate growth which require, not only the taking into 
account of economic forces, but the emotional factors of the 
individuals involved. Current literature on corporate mer­
gers indicate that mergers are products of methodical research,
intensive operations analysis, thorou^ audits, and economic 
12logic. In many instances, the psychological factors such
12Boulden, "Merger Negotiationst" Business Horizons.p. 21.
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as fear, management friction, and motivation are not realis­
tically evaluated prior to and after a merger occurs. Mer­
gers and acquisitions, as reflected in this paper, take into 
account the human/emotional factors which can sometimes mean 
the difference between the success and failure of a merger. 
In addition, as evidenced by the study of the mergers of 
Litton Industries, the type of merger (horizontal, vertical, 
diverse) plays an integral role on executive displacement.
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